The assault in Paris pointed out a fault line, and mobilized it. The transition to this mobilization also rekindled a series of reflexes and discussions.

The matter not only pertains to “religious radicalism”.

The “West-Islam”, “Islam-Radicalism”, “freedom of expression – sacred values”, “Islam – laicism”, “religion – secularism” enmities and relations are forming parallel and different argument paths.

Those arguments also reflect on Turkey.

The reflection style is superficial, as it is in every argument, and especially, instrumental…

It’s instrumental; thus, it’s a “habitual practice”, which we encounter as tensions within our country while polarizations around the political rulership pursue materials from the incidents in France.

It’s superficial, because, while the freedom of expression is being tested over the sacred and taboos in the West, the same mechanism appears as the testing of clashing and crisis in our country.

The dominant opposition view of Turkey, which handles the incident in France around the “victim-attacker mentality dichotomy”, is declaring the political rulership, AK Party, as the mentality partner of “attacker”. Authoritativeness claims and arguments started off from this view, and now they are trying to permute it. It’s being turned into a “nonsense observation” and “analysis” tool, which started by focusing on whether Hollande kissed Davutoğlu or not, continued with whether the Turkish Prime Minister’s entourage had been pushed to the background, and even included the topic that Turkey had been mentioned as an authoritarian country in the Western media after the Paris march.

A CHP parliamentarian thinks that the “Kouchi brothers might have arrived in Turkey”, and gives a statement on this matter, and this makes the news. Even the wife of one of the attackers, Hayat Bumadyen’s (Boumedienne’s) travel to Turkey and her passing to Syria from there right before the incident (in other words, while no questions or doubts were revealed about her identity), can be turned into a Parliamentary question as the indication of Turkey’s support towards ISIL.

Some commentators are developing an attitude as if they are trying to bring the arguments on freedom of expression, religion and secularism to the mood of the 1990s. For example, the natural, cultural and communal balance between the representation of Islam’s prophets and freedom of speech is being shaken by an absolute relation established between this freedom and representation. The clash between the cultural value and judiciary criteria is almost being turned into a wanted “accident”.

Most of these comments were taking place between the architects of the previous chaos and confusion periods.

The language and their mentalities had not changed.

Let’s see what Ertuğrul Özkök wrote from Paris:

“Well! What a great feeling it is to talk about the Republic without being sworn at….

I’m coming from a country, where the Republic word is being belittled, suffers an affront, is trying to be erased from memories. For the past two days, here, I’ve been experiencing an environment where the merits and gains of the republic are being defended….”

Which country is that?

Other than a couple exceptions and meaningless political movements, who had ever belittled the Republic in this country? Is it the Islamists, Kurds, idealists? Who?

Or, what you meant by “Republic” is the state of “surprising alliances that extend from the extreme right to the left and the attitude that gradually withdraws and turns secularism into some type of secularist” about France, which had been emphasized by İnsel?

It shouldn’t happen like that….

There shouldn’t be a withdrawal of the identitiveness of an Islamist and identitiveness of a secularist ….

Such a shame!

Turkey had been referred to as a model at the same rate it ensured the marriages of the cultural and judiciary criteria, and, the universal and local values, and, managed to have Islam and democracy live together after long struggles.

Turkey reached this stage through having contact with the universal values in the Islamist segment over experiences, and the strengthening of the democratization wave in the secular segment.

The country had been saved from the secularism-centered regime crises spiral, after the mentalities, which absolutize its life style, had been collapsed. The country, to a certain degree, had been purified from the Sharia danger paranoia by the reforms in the past 10 years.

Forcing this reversely is mentally and ethically problematic.

“How can Turkey steer away from the dangers created by this fault line, what precautions can it take, how can it contribute to this in the global level?”…

This is the question today….

The political rulership and the opposition party should be pushed in this direction, not to the opposite side...